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THE STATE AS ‘BLACK BOX’ AND THE MARKET AS 
REGULATOR: COMMENT 
Peer Zumbansen* 
I. MARKETS AS REGULATORS 
In face of the dramatically challenged and tired body of the international 
legal order (GOLDSMITH AND POSNER [2005]), searches for its 
reinvigoration, healing or overhaul are well under way. While the 
assessment of its ailings has been occupying public international law [PIL] 
and international relations scholars for a long time (HUDSON [1925],
GOLDSTEIN et al. [2000], KOSKENNIEMI [2002], VAN AAKEN [2006],
MILLER AND BRATSPIES [2008]), the intervention of law & economics 
scholars onto the scene is of more recent venue (SCOTT AND STEPHAN
[2006], GUZMAN [2008]). Professor van Aaken’s suggestion to explore the 
potential of market mechanisms to effectuate international legal regulation 
occurs against the background of this more recent conceptual intervention. 
The following observations will attempt to discuss her proposal by 
revisiting some of PIL’s and international relations’ longer standing 
concerns about an effective legal order. 
II. LAW’S DREAM AND MARKET REALITIES
VAN AAKEN [2009] draws our attention to a number of market-driven 
mechanisms that might be able to give PIL substantive impulses and new 
life. Her examples include the private industry complaint processes around 
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, the Financial Action Task Force and 
the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme. Her interest in these examples 
is the result of changing the analytical lenses through which we have been 
trying to make sense of the double-movement that characterizes the 
transformation of the international legal order. On the one hand, we are 
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faced with the urgent need to make the regime responsive and receptive to 
emerging (and persisting) claims for recognition, rights and identity, some 
of which might pose insurmountable challenges to PIL’s declared 
universalist and cosmopolitan aspirations (HELD [1995, p. 141], 
HABERMAS [2006, p. 5]). On the other hand, the very idea of thinking of a 
body of international law that would bear resemblances with a contained, 
historically grown and solidly institutionalized legal order that we tend to 
recognize within the confines of the Western nation state, fades away 
under the impression of international law’s eternally volatile and 
ephemeral character. The fragmentation of (every) law, that – rightly 
considered – marks the legal project in its foundation, has been pointed to 
in recent times by international legal scholars in order to critically 
ascertain the contested nature of the international legal order and to fend 
off ill-founded rescue attempts in the name of the unity of law 
(KOSKENNIEMI AND LEINO [2002, p. 553]). The fragmentation of (global) 
law must in fact be seen as merely another instantiation of the very fragile 
nature of the legal order as such, regardless of whether our focus is on 
international or domestic law (ZUMBANSEN [2006a], [2008a]). The 
doubtless breathtaking proliferation of norm producers, norm 
entrepreneurs and of alternative processes of norm dissemination and 
enforcement that we witness on the global level, is only an expression of 
law’s functional differentiation (TEUBNER [1997a], [1997b]), not an 
expression of an originally pure and healthy body being impaired. 
It is precisely because global law suffers from the same shortcomings 
and reality shocks that Kafka’s victim is struggling to understand when he 
finds himself ‘before the law’, that Van Aaken’s intuition to explore 
alternatives to traditional law enforcement to save the law from its 
ineffectiveness is correct. That she is willing to entrust the regulation of 
human affairs in the market, however, bears the risk of substituting one 
complex regime (“law”, “state”, “rule of law”) with another one 
(“market”). Her attempt to potentialize ‘market mechanisms’ to strengthen 
PIL’s application in an unruly world shares some (perhaps unrealized) 
parallels to prior explorations of the transnational nature of legal relations 
(JESSUP [1956]). Van Aaken, in scrutinizing market driven mechanisms 
with view to their potential to create conditions of higher compliance or, at 
least, of scandalizations of non-compliance, comes close to repeating 
Philip Jessup’s conceptual move of drawing parallels between conflicts 
over participation, legitimacy and enforcement within and outside of the 
nation state in order to expose the fundamental regulatory challenge to all 
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law. Yet, as Van Aaken relies on a disembedded concept of market 
mechanisms as enforcement driving, this parallel to the regulatory 
experiences of the domestic arena remain untapped. And because there is 
little room in her discussion of PIL’s market-therapy for revisiting the 
trials and tribulations of state–market relations that have marked Western 
industrialized welfare states all through the twentieth century, the analysis 
of the state–market relations in the global arena with changed meanings of 
sovereignty, contract and the ‘public’ ends too early. The application of a 
game-theoretical approach to explain the use of self-regulatory governance 
modes occurs in a highly abstract, purified sphere. In contrast, were we to 
take Jessup’s cue and consider the deep-running regulatory challenges of 
the transnational order through a series of connections between 
governance modes within and outside of the nation state, we would 
probably be in a better position to evaluate the promises of self-regulation 
within the international legal order. 
III. GOVERNANCE COMING OF AGE 
 
Van Aaken is right to point to the merit and urgency with which we need 
to take a close look at the emerging, hybrid public–private regulatory 
regimes that mark the global arena. It is here, where we can hope to find 
elements of an emerging transnational legal order. Van Aaken’s third 
example concerning the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme, designed 
to stem the trade of conflict (“blood”) diamonds, is a perfect illustration of 
the challenges that we face when reassessing the troubled international 
legal order. The Kimberly Process, an initiative jointly entertained by 
governments, industry and civil society, presents us with the dilemma of 
trying to conceptualize an effective regulatory regime despite the 
resistance of numerous key-players. As such, her example feeds into and is 
closely tied to what she refers to as “the whole discussion on Corporate 
Social Responsibility” (VAN AAKEN [2009, p. 23◙). Yet, what has been 
both inspiring and plaguing CSR scholars for decades, is the field’s 
inherent boundarylessness. The most promising approaches to study and 
belabour CSR, then, are connections such as those drawn by Van Aaken 
between normative agendas and existing regulatory structures, in 
particular where those are in constant evolution (RUGGIE [2008], OCHOA 
[2008]). What emerges from this approach is the realization that the 
potential of CSR to make any meaningful contribution to the ongoing 
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regulatory transformation (LEVY AND KAPLAN [2008, p. 439]) depends in 
large part on its capacity to integrate sociological and political economy 
criteria into its model-building processes. The importance of such an 
integrated approach to promote CSR is powerfully illustrated by the 
continued interest in the study of self-regulatory instruments in the context 
of larger regulatory changes, as exemplified by work on corporate codes 
of conduct that formulate duties vis-à-vis their employees, the local 
communities and the environment (BLACKETT [2004], ARTHURS [2002], 
ZUMBANSEN [2006b]). 
This, then, provides the platform on which to comment on the lessons 
that Van Aaken suggests to draw from such instantiations of market 
mechanism as drivers of more effective international law regulation: her 
central claim is that in order to effectuate international sanctions, the 
system must reach beyond the boundaries of the black box of the “state” 
and thus “permeate the network of all actors involved, that is, the market 
forces” (VAN AAKEN [2009, p. 23◙]). In order to achieve this result, two 
conditions must be met: sanctions need to target an end consumer market, 
and NGOs as independent monitors must ensure a sufficient level of 
transparency and publicity. In particular, I want to challenge Van Aaken’s 
suggestion that we need to reach into the state as ‘black box’ in order to 
understand the potential of market mechanism as regulator. 
What is at stake when we speak of the state as a ‘black box’? Van 
Aaken rightly points to important PIL and IR scholarship that has shown 
the degree to which contemporary states ‘disaggregate’ (SLAUGHTER 
[2004]). When speaking of a ‘state’, then, we are dealing with a concept in 
transformation (HOFFMANN [2008, p. 266]). Today, the ‘state’, which in 
public international law is the sovereign actor, equipped with equal rights, 
and author of the norms that bind or empower it, looks very different from 
a functional perspective. From this perspective the state becomes a nodal 
point for various functional processes, and it is in that regard that the state 
is constantly being adjectivised (the “social” or, “welfare” state, the 
“minimal” state, the “enabling” state, the “supervision” state). With regard 
to the state’s sovereignty, its transformation can be described as a two-way 
erosion of sovereignty, one upward with regard to a state’s entered into 
international agreements and accepted or, forced-upon compromises 
(SUMMERS [2001]), and one downward as concerns the long history of 
further expanding mixed, public–private, hybrid forms of state–market 
cooperation and coordination in the delivery of formerly public services 
and of the state’s myriad forms of intervening into the market (GRIMM 
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[1990, p. 291]). A more recent interpretation points to the increasing 
dependence of the state on societal knowledge, the generation of which 
becomes one crucial public mandate of the post-welfare state (LADEUR 
[2006]), an observation that fares well with the economist’s finding in the 
1930s (HAYEK [1937, p. 33], [1945, p. 530]). 
IV. FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNANCE – AND 
BACK? 
 
Van Aaken differentiates between certain ‘issue areas’, where the 
involvement of private actors is allegedly more pertinent than in others. 
The assignment of such areas occurs, however, without offering criteria or 
categories that can be used to convincingly differentiate between ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ concerns. In light of our experiences in public and private 
law with the ‘mixed economy’ of Western welfare states and the eternal 
challenge of these fields’ analytical grip and boundaries, the reliance on 
distinctions between issues in the private or the common, public interest 
seems to bear little promise. These demarcations have themselves become 
very problematic against the background of the changing regulatory 
landscape within nation states (GRIMM [1991], LOBEL [2004]). Such 
reliance comes back, for example, also in form of the distinctions such as 
those that were recently suggested by Gillian Hadfield and Eric Talley 
between “economic” and “justice” concerns through which we ought to be 
able to assign regulatory competences (HADFIELD AND TALLEY [2006]). 
The use of such distinctions is even less warranted in a functionally 
highly differentiated Knowledge society. Today’s society cannot on the 
one hand, as Van Aaken suggests, be described as a global market society, 
if we want to, on the other hand, continue to explain it by reference to 
state–market concepts that we have been struggling with all throughout the 
history of the social and the welfare state. To confront and to take 
seriously, however, the fragmented and functionally differentiated nature 
of society is what should follow from the proposal to reach beyond the 
state as a ‘black box’. In a transnational regulatory sphere, instead of 
recurring to state–society or state–market distinctions, we ought to refocus 
on how and under which disguise these former nation state based political 
debates might re-appear within the transnational sphere. It is here where 
we are in the midst of scrutinizing the role and function of new actors in 
PIL, the fuzzy contours of civil society or the changing ways in enhancing 
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participation and monitoring, for example through a shift to “governance 
through disclosure” (HERBERG [2007], WERNER [2008]). 
To complement the existing, highly contested PIL enforcement 
mechanisms that play out against the background of the ongoing struggle 
between hegemony, fragmentation and universalism with private market 
mechanisms might offer less of a critical basis on which to better 
understand the challenges of transnational regulation. Instead, we ought to 
see the PIL system as a ship under repair on high seas, in order to, first, 
recognize its striking similarities with the legal system currently under 
scrutiny and attack through private ordering mechanisms which might be 
developed too much in isolation from and in rejection of the regulatory 
experiences in the 20th century legal and political orders, in particular the 
welfare state, and, second, learn to better read the complex forms of 
emerging forms of transnational governance in highly specialized 
regulatory fields such as those highlighted in Van Aaken’s paper. 
The proposal to reach beyond the state as the central focal point in 
regulating PIL gains credibility in view of the shift of concepts of 
government in public international law to those of governance (ENGEL 
[2001, p. 571], ENGEL AND KELLER (eds.) [2000]). But that shift – from 
government to governance – creates in fact a number of far-reaching 
challenges that we must take seriously in our attempt to adequately 
understand the role of market mechanism in rendering legal regulation 
more effective. One is that when we speak about the way in which the 
state as law-maker and law-enforcer in PIL is challenged by and 
competing with emerging private governance regimes, we have to draw on 
our experiences with public–private governance, privatization and indirect 
regulation in our long history of highly complex market regulation. After 
decades of transforming the interventionist into a moderating, enabling, 
empowering and bargaining state, there exists plenty of evidence of 
contractualized and outsourced public functions. Because these have 
emerged over the last 30 years from within mature constitutional regimes, 
their direct translatability onto governance issues concerning multinational 
corporations or transnational trade regimes might be limited. At the same 
time, it is important to take seriously the persistent conceptual and 
normative pitfalls that (re-)occur within these transnational regulatory 
regimes. We would be so naïve to think we can find or perhaps recreate on 
the transnational plane the same or equivalent institutional, political and 
legal framework in which struggles over rights, entitlements and 
redistribution have taken place within the nation-state. Rather, we are 
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faced with the inevitable recognition that the ways in which we must make 
choices over how to regulate ‘issue areas’, we are likely to rely concepts 
and patterns which themselves are deeply embedded in our particular 
histories of legal, direct and indirect, regulation. 
Those histories have of course dramatically different contours with 
regard to the mix of formal and informal regulation, the institutional 
environment and the varieties of institutional change (NORTH [2005]). But 
because we deal on a comparative basis with differences that Hall and 
Soskice have called, “Varieties of Capitalism” (HALL AND SOSKICE (eds.) 
[2001]), and which constitute in fact a great range of differently evolved 
‘institutional complementarities’ (BOYER [2005, p. 64]), we should not 
think of the state–market relation in the transnational arena as in any way 
less complex: 
“[M]ost of the institutions that are today perceived as complementary, were in 
fact created for distinct purposes and only the succession of crises, experiments 
and sequential innovations finally delivered the complementarity that is 
recognized at the end of a rather long historical process.” (BOYER [2005, p. 64]) 
According to Boyer, complementarity, among other factors, provides the 
glue that holds together a global institutional architecture. Even in an era 
of globalization, financialization and knowledge-based competitiveness, 
national economies still exhibit contrasted institutional configurations, and 
from that it follows that capitalism diversity is not a matter of pure 
historical legacy, inertia or irrationality. 
This means, that the expanded view on PIL enforcement by market 
mechanisms can learn much from already existing and further emerging 
private governance regimes in domestic legal orders on the one hand and 
from comparative political economy on the other. Examples of domestic 
soft-law and indirect regulation abound, let’s only mention standard 
setting, food safety, or even corporate governance. Those regulatory fields 
are increasingly unfolding in a transnational arena. But their apparent 
borderless nature does not mean that they are not to be associated with a 
whole range of conceptual and architectural burdens that can only be 
explained when looking closer at the market–state relationship. 
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V. THE TRANSNATIONAL TRANSLATION 
 
Among the areas showing great regulatory innovativeness and 
evolutionary dynamics is corporate governance. Its regulation offers 
valuable insights into the nature of what should adequately be called 
“transnational legal pluralism” (ZUMBANSEN [2008b]). While this term 
recognizes the multiplicity of normative orders at work in the creation of 
regulatory regimes, it is also helpful in redirecting our focus to the 
particular interplay of soft and hard law in these regimes. Corporate 
governance reveals its complex structure only when we closely follow the 
genesis of corporate governance norms through the maze of global 
discussions over convergence or divergence, the scandalization of 
corporate misconduct and the different national reactions, often resulting 
in a complex mix of direct and indirect regulation. Corporate governance 
then unfolds as a prime example of a transnational regulatory regime, can 
only be understood if we pay close attention to the ways in which the state 
on the domestic level again and again facilitates and monitors processes of 
self-regulation. The pressing need to reassert the regulatory structure of 
such an area stems from the supposedly natural course by which it is said 
to have been evolving over the past twenty years, that have seen the 
triumphant march of shareholder value as the exclusive governing 
principle in corporate law (HANSMANN AND KRAAKMANN [2001]). There 
is, however, nothing natural about the market and its dynamics. Markets 
are constituted, property rights are allocated competences and vest public 
authority in private parties to engage in the distribution of power (HALE 
[1923, p. 478], COHEN [1927, pp. 11f.]). The breathless emergence of the 
insatiable market as organizational principle certainly threatened such 
insights and provided the basis for far-reaching claims as to its superiority 
in governing human affairs: 
“[T]he control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming 
consequence to the whole organization of society: it means no less than the 
running of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being 
embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic 
system.” (POLANYI [1944, p. 57]) 
A little later in his text, Polanyi observes:  
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“With every step that the state took to rid the market of particularist restrictions, 
of tolls and prohibitions, it imperiled the organized system of production and 
distribution which was now threatened by unregulated competition and the 
intrusion of the interloper who ‘scooped’ the market but offered no guarantee of 
permanency.” (p. 66) 
Professor van Aaken’s ingtriguing and challenging paper goes a good way 
in laying out the dilemma with which we are faced when designing 
transnational regulatory regimes. And she is right to imply that we might 
have to go farther than to utter ‘plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’. 
The particular nature of the emerging transnational regimes, which we 
continue to helplessly refer to as private, quasi-public, or hybrid actors and 
that are situated in experimental forms of governance, regulation and self-
regulation, however, seriously limits our options. In light of the 
unavailability of either Polanyi’s or the Legal Realists’ return to a 
deconstruction of market freedoms as political freedoms, the remaining 
task is to think of ways to translate the institutional and normative 
underpinning of embeddedness into this new transnational context. 
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